For example, kin altruism might recommend that I sacrifice myself for my family, whether I care about them or not, whereas rational egoism would recommend sacrifice only if my welfare were to be higher were I to sacrifice and die rather than not sacrifice and live. For example, in favour of my point of view, Sidgwick could note that I am an individual rather than a hive-member. But fit with motivation is hardly decisive; any normative theory, including ethical egoism, is intended to guide and criticize our choices, rather than simply endorse whatever we do. An ethical egoist could challenge whatever constraint is deployed against her. Chernyshevsky's standpoint was ultimately socialistic, and was criticised by in the 1864 book. Takový člověk se nazývá egoista, sobec.
The problem is that, as the discussion of the cooperation argument shows, it also fails to fit some of the confident moral judgments we make. There are many competing egoistic hypotheses. Kant, Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, § 2. Since there are other attacks, it would not follow that the distinction between people matters. But it is not clear how these facts support the normative conclusion Sidgwick draws. Egoismus z , já je moderní označení pro , obvykle ale s méně významem. An egoist might claim that continuity alone matters for special care; that fits the cases.
They see no reason for special care for this future person. That I am the one who helps them may, for example, satisfy my self-regarding desire for power. Parfit also argues that since the connections between the present mental state and the mental state of one's future self may decrease, it is not plausible to claim that one should be indifferent between one's present and future self. This gets at what ethical egoists intend, while skirting the issue of constraints on moral theories. In this case, it is insufficient to describe how we are motivated; what is relevant is a description of how we would be motivated were we rational. No, egoism makes us sick, and because of it many people have got themselves into terrible circumstances. Je to podle něho hlavní motor lidského i zvířecího života, samo jádro individua, proti němuž má prosazovat.
Das Gleichgewicht gerät immer mehr in Gefahr. But there is no need to concede that the satisfaction of these desires is not part of my welfare. The issue of what makes for a moral theory is contentious. Tradice britského myšlení od po , ovlivněná , naopak soudila, že člověk prostě tím, že sleduje své vlastní zájmy, zároveň slouží také druhým, jak je to patrné právě v ekonomické směně. Nietzsche, Mimo dobro a zlo.
Suppose I claim that I ought to maximize the welfare of blue-eyed people, but not of other people. . His personality was many-sided enough to make his egoism representative. This makes my decision to buy anchovies rather than broccoli non-arbitrary. Indeed, without an estimate of how strong this desire is, there is no reason to think the egoistic hypothesis is less reliable. Any man of self-esteem will answer: No.
Question: sei von der Situationsethik abgelöst worden. And I do have reason to care specially about other people who bear these connections to me now. Finally, if I do not believe that some action is ultimately in my self-interest, it follows from psychological egoism that I cannot aim to do it. The altruistic hypothesis also has some of the same problems: for example, just as there might not be enough pain, the non-instrumental desire that the child do well might not be strong enough to defeat other desires. Apparently altruistic action is often revealed to be self-interested. The issue is whether man is to be regarded as a sacrificial animal. This argument can be directed against rational egoism as well.
Na rozdíl od předchozích totiž přece jen chápala společenskou povahu člověka a tedy nezapomněla, že sobectví není vlastnost, nýbrž vztah, který není možné připisovat jednotlivcům. I do not, for example, think the reason I have a duty to help a drowning child is that helping benefits me Prichard 2002 1, 9, 26, 29, 30, 122, 123, 171, 188. It allows for weakness of will, since in weakness of will cases I am still aiming at my own welfare; I am weak in that I do not act as I aim. Second, Elliot Sober and David Wilson argue that evolutionary theory supports altruism. He has a better life, in terms of welfare, by avoiding years of guilt. This worry makes sense, but if continuity were sufficient for special care, it would not. Nietzsche, Mimo dobro a zlo.
Utilitarians, for example, agree about these facts. Many of these constraints are met by ethical egoism — the formal constraints, for example, that moral claims must be prescriptive and universalizable. I do not, for example, escape a duty to save a drowning person, when I can easily do so, just because the drowning person or anyone watching happens never to be able to offer fruitful cooperation or retaliation. This can be interpreted in various ways Shaver 1999, 82—98; Phillips 2011, ch. For an account of an experiment done in reply, favouring Batson, see Stich, Doris and Roedder 2010, as well as Batson 2011 135—145. Sidgwick might instead be claiming that attacks on rational egoism from certain views of personal identity as in Parfit, discussed below fail because they rest on a false view of personal identity. Since these variants are uncommon, and the arguments for and against them are largely the same as those concerning the standard version, I set them aside.